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BOOK REVIEW

Knowledge and Politics. By Roberto Mangabiera Unger. New York: The
Free Press. 1975. Pp. ix, 336. $12.95.
Unger's Knowledge and Politics begins mysteriously with a solemn enunciation of the need for "total criticism" of the liberal state. Clarification of the
aims or purposes of such criticism is not forthcoming, at least not until some
200 pages later. Meanwhile, the reader is led through a confused and
confusing critique of "antinomies" in the psychological and moral assumptions
allegedly underlying the liberal state. In each case, Unger's identification of an
antinomy ultimately seems to rest on remarkably superficial analysis. For
example, Unger claims that in the theory and practice of the liberal state there
is an unresolvable contradiction between the idea that impersonal rules should
be applied impartially to similar cases and the idea that rules should be
enforced in order to effectuate underlying policies. But an in-depth reflection
on these ideas fails to sustain the claim of any contradiction. On the contrary,
the purposive analysis of any rule importantly clarifies the scope of its
application. Often one cannot know how a rule should be applied, or what
counts as a similar or dissimilar case, until one understands the purposes of
the rule. In short, ideas, supposed by Unger to be contradictory, are in fact
interdependent; the rational pursuit of one goal requires the reasonable
pursuit of the other.
Another example of Unger's unconvincing identification of "antinomies" is
his claim that the liberal state is committed to a view of the subjectivity of
value, which contradicts the related postulate of liberal thought that rational
desires should be pursued. Again, Unger's claim that liberal thought confusedly affirms contradictory values reflects his own analytic confusion rather
than a confusion in liberal thought. He fails to give any coherent account of
the sense in which liberalism regards values as subjective. Certainly many
prominent liberal theorists-for example Locke, Rousseau and Kant-wholly
rejected the view that values are subjective; indeed, they would probably not
have understood the claim, familiar enough today, that values cannot rationally be discussed. Unger confuses the substantive liberal claim that people
should be allowed the broadest possible liberty to define and pursue their
rational good as they see fit with the quite different claim that there is no
rational way to assess the morality of the values people affirm. Classical
liberals believed the former and denied the latter. Unger's entire discussion of
the subjectivity of values rests on his failure to make basic distinctions among
concepts central to an intelligent discussion of liberal thought.
In general, Unger's discussion of contradictions implicit in liberal thought
often fails to see or give weight to analytic distinctions easily perceivable at
the level of concrete operations of legal systems. This failure arises, I believe,
from the remarkable level of abstraction at which his book is written. Surely
abstract theoretical reflection about the law and its purposes is sorely, even
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desperately, needed; the lack of such theory impoverishes the life and practice
of the law, depriving lawyers, judges, legislators, and other men of affairs of
the critical self-consciousness about the proper aims of the law that only good
theory can afford. But theory must connect at some significant level with the
actual experience of the law-the process of judges deciding cases, of legislators deciding on the form of statutory law, and the like. Unger's book makes
no such connection at any point; no case or aspect of cases is discussed, no
concrete legal institution critically assessed. Rather, Unger's theorizing occurs
at a respectful distance from even the possibility of seriously engaging theory
with practice. Such theoretical abstraction has the virtue of allowing Unger to
indulge his preference for a style of portentous grandeur and prophetic
apostrophe; its vice, however, is the deepest criticism of any theory, emptiness.
Unger's "total criticism" of the liberal state is mysterious. One wonders
what is the point of view from which this criticism proceeds. Finally, after
some 200 confused and confusing pages, a point of view emerges. It is simply
a kind of Platonic analysis of the state in terms of the ideal self (as in The
Republic), where the content of the ideal self is that defined by Marx in The
Economic and PhilosophicManuscripts of 1844. Unger's account of the ideal
self represents no advance beyond Marx. Ultimate appeal is made to the idea
of "species man." Those laws or legal institutions are desirable that conduce
to the development and emergence of "species man," which represents, as
Unger puts it, "the union of the universal in the concrete, and the transcendent in the immanent." Nowhere are these ideas precisely elucidated, yet they
are the fundamental moral conceptions on which Unger's constructive theory
rests. One wonders what a judge or legislator would say to a political or legal
philosopher who proposed as the standard of decision "whatever conduces to
the emergence of species man as the union of the universal in the concrete."
Such a standard of moral decision would be greeted justly by incredulity,
incomprehension, and perhaps anger at the failure of philosophy to observe
the minimal intellectual obligation of affording men of affairs workable moral
principles by which to critically assess legal institutions.
Unger's substantive moral conception is, I have suggested, inadequately
explained and explicated. Insofar as one can understand the substantive
nature of his moral ideal, however, it seems deeply flawed, and indeed itself
morally indefensible.
Unger's moral theory is Platonic and Marxist. Following Plato, Unger
conceives the moral assessment of the state in terms of the organic analogy of
a complete, fully developed, and abundant human self. Plato, of course,
ordered polities in terms of the degree to which they preserve a proper order
among the parts of the ideal soul. Thus, tyrannical states were criticized on
the model of a corrupt human soul dominated solely by immediate appetitive
drives; states ruled by philosopher-kings are praised on the model of the
human self controlled by philosophical wisdom and balance. Unger adapts
this basic model of normative analysis to Marx's concept of the ideal self as
"species man." Very roughly, Marx supposed that men have a kind of real self
capable of a life of extended sociability and infinitely varied personal
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competences; accordingly capitalist society was criticized insofar as it warps
this ideal human self into a life of sharply circumscribed sociality (limiting
affection to the nuclear family) and narrow competences (in accord with the
division of labor). Unger accepts this basic model of the ideal self. Human
beings, he claims, have extensive capacities for sympathetic identification and
affection that the liberal capitalist state drives into narrow personal relationships. Such capacities for love and affection, now excluded from the public
world of work and politics, should be returned to the public world. Similarly,
the division of labor, Unger suggests, should be modified (not, as Marx
thought, abolished) to allow the fuller expression of human competence.
Organic analogies, whether in Plato, Marx, or Unger, are intrinsically
totalitarian. The state, conceived as a kind of organic personality, has a life
and health apart from its parts; just as a sick limb may be amputated for the
good of the organic whole, individual human interests and rights may be
disregarded for the good of the state. Human beings in turn are conceived as
having a kind of ideal self, knowable by some process of philosophical reason
or intuition, and the role of the state accordingly is to realize that ideal self,
despite contrary wishes of citizens who are blind to the mandates of philosophical reason or intuition. Given such ideas, it is no accident that Plato and
Marx, and now Unger, respectively criticized Athenian democracy, the liberal
state of nineteenth century England, or constitutional liberal democracy as we
know and practice it in the United States today. Liberal democracy has
persistently rejected organic analogies precisely because they ignore the crucial moral relevance of individual human rights and interests which the state
cannot or should not morally ignore. This moral ideal of intrinsic limits on the
proper exercise of state power is, of course, quite foreign to organic analogy
theories like those of Plato, Marx, or Unger, which acknowledge no precise
limits on the power of the state to realize the ideal self, whether the ideal self
is the philosophical soul or species man.
At bottom, Unger's theory, like Marx's, fundamentally misconstrues the
ideals of political, social, aid economic justice on the model of personal love.
Intense personal love is marked by the identification of the interests of another
with one's own, the desire for physical and psychological closeness, the
evident intention of doing good to the other, and the like. Human love, in
short, derives its power from its capacity to bridge the gap between or among
persons as separate beings. The lover and the beloved are in a real, not a
merely metaphorical sense, one. Ideals of justice in our common social
institutions do not, however, derive from any such unity of affection. Fairness
among people does not require that people like, let alone love, one another.
On the contrary, claims to fairness in basic distributive questions are justly
made by those neither liked nor having any claim to be liked. Justice rests, in
short, not on the unity of love but on the separateness of persons as
individuals and their moral rights as persons to fair access to the goods of life.
Liberal constitutional democracy rests importantly on such moral ideas requiring that certain rights be afforded notwithstanding majoritarian sentiments to
the contrary.
Unger's substantive moral theory thus fails to give expression to fundamen-

876

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

tal ideas of human rights. One prominent omission in this connection is any
mention of the right of privacy. Unger's ideas of communitarian purposes
would have difficulty in accounting for the right of privacy. Unger's concept
of political love would require that, as with actual lovers, all privacy rights
among the lovers be waived. But, surely, there is no more essential value
characteristic of advanced civilization than the right of privacy, the right of
people to be left alone in the pursuit of their interests as they define them.
Unger's view, in contrast, suggests the primitive morality of the tribe or the
clan.
Unger adumbrates certain persuasive moral criticisms of the liberal state as
we know it. He argues, for example, that justice required more equality in the
distribution of basic political, economic, and social goods, and that principles
of meritocratic ascription of status may be as unjust as former principles of
ascription by birth or caste. Such criticisms, merely suggested by Unger, can
be given more solid theoretical support than Unger's flimsy ideas of "species
man." John Rawls' A Theory of Justice indicates how such criticisms might
persuasively be made. Significantly, Rawls' work is an expression of the
liberal tradition that Unger rejects. In short, liberal theory more persuasively
criticizes the practice of the liberal state than Unger's "total criticism" theory.
I have suggested that Unger's moral ideal suggests the primitivist morality
of the tribe or the clan. Like Marx, Unger ultimately views just social
relationships on the model of intense personal relationships, as among lovers
or in the nuclear family. Beneath a wealth of sophisticated analysis lies a kind
of poetic reverie for a lost love or childhood, which theory now apocalyptically validates. It is no accident, therefore, that Marx's theory ends with the
paradise on earth in the indefinite future, or that Unger concludes with an
eschatological appeal to God. The hunger for love thus seeks paradise lost.
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